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Trade Policy and Leapfrogging 
1. Introduction 
The New Trade Theory is characterized by an extensive use of IO-models of imperfect 
competition due to the generally accepted notion that many international markets are 
imperfect.I Another property of international markets is the presence of vertical quality 
differences ("high" vs. "Iow" product quality) between substitutable products. Product 
differentiation of this type is an important dimension in international trade, since trade in 
differentiated but substitutable products (intra-industry trade) has grown most in the last 
decades. Explanations for intra-industry trade are based on the cross-hauling or reciprocal-
dumping argument.2 In this context, product quality is a strategic variable for the firm that can 
be influenced by trade policy.3 The resulting product asymmetries are often attributable to 
historically grown regional differences in technology and production costs4 (e.g. in the 
European car market), but they are also influenced by regional asymmetries with respect to 
market size, income, demand, technology and production costs. 5 Two further developments 
of the last decades have contributed to the increased importance of an analysis of international 
markets in the presence of regional asymmetries with respect to market conditions and trade 
policy. These developments could be labelled globalization and regionalization, respectively.6 
Globalization denotes the process of increasing international integration of markets due to the 
reduction of real and institutional costs of trade in goods, factors of production, technologies 
and information. However, at the same period, trade policy has become more and more 
regionally oriented. For example, trade policies of the EU and NAFT A affect about 60% of 
world trade. 
In the presence of regional asymmetries, national industries will either be market leaders 
or be lagging behind in the international market place in terms of their product qualities. The 
1 See e.g. Bresnahan (1989). 
2See e.g. BranderiKrugman (1983). 
3Sec Mintz (1973), Le\'insohn (1988), Fccnstra (1988, 1993), Menzlcr-Hokkanen (1994). 
4Regional asymmetries witl. respect to production costs can also be the result of differences in factor 
endo\\ments. 
5 See e.g. CabralcslMotta (1995), Mottarrhisse/Cabrales (1995). 
6Baldwin/Vcnables (1994). 
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resulting asymmetry in profits creates powerful incentives for lagging industries as well as their 
national governments to reverse this situation to their advantage, i.e. to induce "Leapfrogging" 
in terms of product qualities. This switch in competitive stance can, e.g., be induced by direct 
foreign investment into backward industries (East Germany, transformation economies) or by 
government measures such as subsidies, quotas or standards. Even trade liberalization has 
similar effects in certain circumstances. Examples of Leapfrogging-oriented trade policies are 
found in public programs that involve subsidizing research and development (R&D) in 
European value-added industries. The EU Commission has established a program that 
subsidizes R&D joint ventures in telecom and information technologies (SPRIT). More 
examples are found in the EU's environment, marine and biological programs, respectively. 
The conceptual economic framework that explicitly includes quality aspects and 
regional asymmetries into the analysis is provided by models of vertical product differentiation. 
Product differentiation entails an additional strategic choice in form of an investment in quality 
(R&D, human and technological capital) prior to the final product market competition. These 
models are also particularly useful for the analysis of trade policies and Leapfrogging. This 
paper presents an overview of existing research on vertical product differentiation and 
Leapfrogging as well as several new results and questions. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 present the basic 
analytical framework and some main results about market behavior. Section 4 presents 
theoreticfil arguments for Leapfrogging induced by production subsidies, quality standards, 
quotas, tariffs, and trade liberalization. Section 5 discusses the significance of different cost 
specifications and market conditions. Section 6 surveys some empirical evidence on quality 
differentiation and market structure. Section 7 concludes. 
2. The Theoretical Framework 
Most of the theoretical results presented in this paper have been derived by utilizing 
some specific model out of the class of models of imperfect competition and vertical product 
quality differentiation. In this section, we introduce one benchmark model that has been 
extensively applied in the literature. The consequences of altering specific significant features, 
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such as form of competition or cost structures, are discussed later. Our benchmark analytical 
framework utilizes a two-country model of imperfect competition. This allows for the analysis 
of effects of various national and international economic policy measures on national welfare, 
industry profits and consumers' welfare in more than one country. The analysis captures some 
of the most important aspects of international markets. 
The effects of trade policy on product quality have been investigated since the mid-70s 
but earlier studies are restricted to the cases of perfect competition or monopolyJ Other 
studies take oligopolistic competition into account but assume exogenously fixed product 
qualities. 8 The standard model of duopolistic competition with endogenous product qualities 
has been developed since the beginning of the 80s (Mussa/Rosen 1978, GabszewiczlThisse 
1979, Shaked/Sutton 1982, Champsaur/Rochet 1989, Ronnen 1991)9. Consumers have 
identical preferences and different incomes. The income differences lead to differences in the 
willingness to pay for a particular product quality. Two firms offer products of different 
qualities in two (domestic and foreign) markets. The firms bear quality-dependent costs and 
compete in qualities and prices in a two-stage industry game. Since higher product 
differentiation reduces substitutability and price competition, even identical firms will offer 
distinct qualities in the resulting market equilibrium. Trade will take place since both firms 
operate in both markets (reciprocal-dumping argument). National governments can use trade 
policy to improve the strategic position of domestic industries (see e.g. Brander/Spencer 1984, 
Krishna 1989). There is also the possibility of strategic noncooperative interaction between 
two national governments. 
The point of departure or benchmark case for the following discussion is a particular 
model labelled for this purpose as Type A. The Type-A model represents consumers by a 
uniform distribution of an income parameter in the interval [0, t]. In addition, production costs 
consist exclusively of quality-dependent convex fixed costs, i.e. marginal costs (with respect to 
quantity) are constant (equal to zero). Type A obtains market equilibria with incomplete 
market coverage (not all consumers buy). Without other entry costs, the number of firms in 
7 See Spcncc (1975), Rodrigucz (1979), FaJvey (1979), SanlonilVan Colt (1980), Mayer (1982), 
DaslDonnenfcld (1987), Krishna (1987), Bond (1988). 
8See e.g. Leland (1979), Shapiro (1983) 
9For an overyiew, see Tirole (1988) or Waterson (1989). 
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the market is unlimited (no Finiteness Property). Furthermore, the profits of the firm providing 
the higher quality are higher than the profits of the other firm. 
3. Some Basic Theoretical Results 
In duopolistic models of vertical product differentiation, there generally exist two 
equilibria (in pure strategies) since a priori either firm can decide to offer either the higher or 
the lower quality. With identical firms, the two equilibria are essentially (up to the order of 
firms) identical. Therefore, most of the previous work is restricted to marginal analysis in the 
vicinity of one of these equilibria (e.g. Ronnen 1991, Motta 1992, 1993, Cremer/Thisse 1994, 
Boom 1995). Other studies apply marginal analysis also to the second equilibrium (e.g. 
CrampeslHollander 1995, MottalThisselCabrales 1995). 
The existence of regional asymmetries (especially with respect to cost of quality) can 
lead to the existence of only one equilibrium. This effect can also be attained by various trade 
policies( e.g. subsidies, tariffs, quality standards). This provides powerful incentives for the use 
of trade policy in the case where the domestic industry is initially in the position leading to 
lower profits. This is especially the case for the Type-A model. For the analysis of these 
cases, a complete description of firms profit-maximizing strategies (quality best responses) and 
the resulting multiple equilibria is crucial. This is the case, since the effects of various trade 
policy instruments are not always marginal (with respect to one initial equilibrium). On the 
contrary, trade policy can induce a switch from an initial equilibrium to another equilibrium. In 
the case of vertical product differentiation, this switch means that the firm initially offering the 
qualitatively inferior product ends up producing the qualitatively superior product 
(qualitativeltechnological Leapfrogging). This effect can be caused also, for example, by direct 
foreign investment in backward industries, industry-specific subsidies, or regional investment in 
infrastructure. 
In describing firms' profit-maximizing strategic responses, the cases of quantity 
(Cournot) and price (Bertrand) competition need to be distinguished since they affect firms' 
profits differently. ID Under Bertrand competition, a firm's profit functions consist of two 
lOThis description offirm's quality best responses is based on Aoki (1995) and Lutz (l996c). 
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strictly concave segments connecting at the quality level of the competitor (see Figure 1). 
Each of these segments contains a local profit maximum, leaving the firm to decide whether to 
choose the low-quality or the high-quality maximum. If the competitor's quality rises, then the 
low-quality segment of the profit function rises and the high-quality segment falls making the 
low-quality choice more attractive. This gives rise to a quality best response where both firms 
set their qualities as strategic complements (see Figure 2). Profits along this quality best 
response are as follows: With a competitor's quality close to zero, a firm will set a high quality 
making close to monopoly profits. As the competitor's quality rises, the firm's profits decrease 
as long as it provides the higher quality. Eventually it will be more profitable to provide lower 
quality. From then on, profits increase with an increase in the competitor's quality. With two 
identical firms i and j that set qualities Si and Sj, this gives rise to a situation as depicted in 
Figure 3, where the intersections of the best responses indicate two asymmetric equilibria. 
Generally, there will be two pure-strategy equilibria as long as firms are not too different with 
respect to cost of providing quality. The ratio of high quality to low quality is constant with 
respect to market size but increases monotonically in the ratio of cost parameters of the two 
firms. The existence of a unique quality equilibrium due to cost differences can be illustrated 
using Figure 3. In Figure 3, an increase in the fix cost of firm j would lead to a leftward shift in 
qbrj. If this increase gets sufficiently large, the intersection of qbrj and qbrj in the lower right 
corner of Figure 3 vanishes. Only one equilibrium with firm i providing high quality remains. 
This is illustrated in Figure 4. 
While the existence of Cournot versus Bertrand competition does not affect the 
qualitative market outcome much without regulation or trade policy, there is a variety of 
evidence for some significance of market conduct in the presence of such policies. 11 Cournot-
conduct entails a lower degree of price competition than Bertrand-conduct. Generally, this 
leads to higher quality differentiation and profits in the former case. Profits, however, are a 
key variable for the analysis of entry, exit and Leapfrogging. Furthermore, with Cournot-con-
duct, qualities are not generally strategic complements any more. In the case of the duopoly, 
11 Direct comparisuns ha\'e been forwarded, for example, by Motta (1993), Aoki (1995) and 
HergueralKujallPetrakis (1996. 199.t). The case of trade policy in the presence of price competition has been 
treated, for example, by Krishna (1987. 1989), Cremerffhisse (1994) and Boom (1995), while the case of 
quantity competition was analyzed. for example, by DasfPonnenfeld (1989). 
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the higher quality will be set as a strategic complement whereas the lower quality will be set as 
a strategic substitute. This is potentiaJly significant with respect to any policy that directly 
changes the shape of quality best responses (e.g. quality standards). However, in many cases 
market results will be very similar. In the following sections, we will discuss differences where 
appropriate. 
Furthermore, policies such as quality standards enable one firm to prevent exit of the 
competitor although the firm lacks this ability in the unregulated market equilibrium (without 
additional fixed entry costs) (Lutz 1996b). This effect can also be present for various other 
trade policies. Section 4.2. below contains a case (HergueralLutz 1996a) where a quality 
standards leads to Leapfrogging and exit of one firm. 12 
4. Policies that Facilitate Leapfrogging 
The possibility of Leapfrogging arises generaJly when a policy changes an industry'S 
potential profits as the high-quality provider relative to its profits as the low-quality provider. 
It follows that a general analysis of Leapfrogging necessitates the analysis of firms' strategic 
best responses and profits. The intersection of two firm's quality best responses constitutes a 
(pure-strategy) Nash equilibrium in qualities. As already outlined in Section 3, the number as 
well as the locations of the equilibria are determined by the relative locations of the best 
responses, which in turn are determined by market factors, cost factors, and (trade) policies 
applied. In particular, any policy that shifts the quality best response of a firm may lead to a 
switch from one equilibrium to another. One particular policy of this kind is a production or 
R&D subsidy, another one is an ad-valorem tariff. Both policies directly change the cost of 
providing a certain level of quality. Other policies such as quality standards, quantity 
constraints or specific tariffs affect firms' quality best responses in a much less straight-forward 
way. They may lead to Leapfrogging in certain circumstances, but their analysis is more 
complicated. Since the literature on Leapfrogging is rather fragmentary at this time, we will 
often restrict the discussion to presentations of certain benchmark cases or examples. In what 
12 Earlier work on entry (e.g. Donnenfc1dJWebcr 1992, Hung/Schmitt 1992) concentrates on cases where fixed 
entry costs are present. 
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follows, we will discuss R&D or production subsidies, mmmmm quality standards, trade 
liberalization, tariffs, and quantitative trade restrictions. 
4.1. R&D or Production Subsidies 
This case is discussed concentrating on Bertrand competition in the second stage of the 
industry game, since the qualitative results will be the same for the case of Cournot 
competition. Even though the analysis of Leapfrogging in a vertical product differentiation 
framework has recently been addressed by authors such as HergueralKujallPetrakis (1994), 
Lutz (1996b), and MottalThisse/Cabrales (1995), there is hardly any literature covering the 
usage of R&D subsidies to induce Leapfrogging.13 The analysis presented here is from 
HergueralLutz (1996b). 
As outlined in Section 3, Bertrand competition will lead to a quality best responses 
where both firms set their qualities as strategic complements (as in Figure 2). With two 
identical firms i and j that set qualities Si and Sj, this gives rise to a situation as depicted in 
Figure 3 and there will be two pure-strategy equilibria as long as firms are not too different 
with respect to cost of providing quality. The ratio of high quality to low quality is constant 
with respect to market size but increases monotonically in the ratio of cost parameters of the 
two firms. The existence of a unique quality equilibrium due to cost differences can be 
illustrated using Figures 3 and 4. In Figure 3, an increase in the fix cost of firm j would lead to 
a leftward shift in qbrj' If this increase gets sufficiently large, the intersection of qbfj and qbrj 
in the lower right corner of Figure 3 vanishes, Only one equilibrium with firm i providing high 
quality remains. This is shown in Figure 4. 
This case starts from an initial situation with identical firms, where one is domestic 
(firm i) and the other is foreign and both are acting in the domestic market. It is assumed that 
the domestic firm is initially offering the lower quality, providing the motive for a 
Leapfrogging-inducing policy by the domestic government. This initial situation could be the 
outcome of the foreign firm being longer in the market than the domestic firm, so that the 
foreign firm operated as a Stackelberg-Ieader towards the domestic firm in the past. The 
130ther issues related to R&D are treated,e,g., by Motta (1991), LeahfINeary (l995a, 1995b). 
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analysis shows that an R&D subsidy can be found that leads to a reversal of the quality 
ordering in equilibrium and increases domestic profits as well as domestic welfare (measured as 
the sum of consumer surplus and profits minus subsidy cost). 
However, it cannot be generally argued for the application of such policies, even though 
this case entails welfare increases for the domestic country. Since strategic interaction between 
governments will likely take the form of a subsidy race leading to a prisoner's dilemma, this 
analysis merely suggests that policy makers should be aware of the possibility of rather radical 
effects ofR&D subsidies. 
4.2. Minimum Quality Standards 
Ronnen (1991) uses Shaked and Sutton's framework to demonstrate cases where 
quality standards improve welfare. He concludes that there exists a binding minimum quality 
standard such that all consumers are weakly better off, both firms have positive profits, and 
total welfare is increased. As a result of such a standard, profits of the high-quality provider 
must fall, whereas profits of the low-quality provider may even rise if the standard is set close 
to the equilibrium level of low quality without regulation. 14 Crampes/Hollander (I 995) present 
a study where quality improvements fall on variable costs. They present results where all 
consumers lose through the imposition of a standard. Boom (1995) introduces National 
Treatment of standards into a two-country model. Here, a relatively high standard imposed in 
one country can lead to market exit and a reduction of product variety in one country reducing 
consumers' welfare. Lutz (1996a, J996b, 1996c) analyzes standards under Mutual 
Recognition. Here, each government maximizes regional welfare subject to its own standard. 
Now both firms face binding standards and are forced to increase quality. This leads to a 
14Ronnen starts from the assumption that the chosen order of qualities is already determined, i.e. it is a priori 
clear which of the firms ofTers the higher quality. Consequently. Ronnen analyzed firms quality best responses 
only in the vicinity of one existing equilibrium. Howe\'er, with completely endogenous choice of quality. there 
exist up to two equilibria and each finn's quality best response is discontinuous and contains a high- and a low-
quality branch. respectively. In our paper. we demonstrate the derivation of complete quality bcst responses and 
the resulting equilibria. These equilibria are in pure strategies. If there are two pure-strategy equilibria, there 
also exists at least onc mixed-strategy equilibrium. Howcver, thc analysis of mixed-strategy cquilibria is 
beyond the scope of this work. The emerger.ce of multiple equilibria has also been acknowledged by, e.g., 
Boom (1995) or Crampesl Hollander (1995). The question of selection between two asymmetric equilibria was 
recently addressed by Mottaffhissc/Cabrales (1995) who demonstrate how the risk dominance criterion can be 
utilized for this purpose in models of the type employed here. 
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higher degree of product differentiation than with a single standard. However, since costs are 
convex in quality, the government regulating the low-quality provider prefers to increase its 
industry's quality more than the other government. Therefore, quality differentiation is lower 
than without regulation. In addition, each region benefits from an increase in quality of the 
other region's product. Introducing quality standards will increase both qualities, reduce the 
ratio of qualities, reduce both national industries' profits, increase national welfare in both 
regions, and reduce the rati9 of national welfares. 
The effects of quality standards on industry competition are primarily driven by their 
influence on price competition and the qualities produced. Due to the duopoly situation and 
the nature of price and quality coi11petition, an unregulated equilibrium results in qualities being 
too low, prices being too high and quality differentiation being too low when compared to a 
welfare-maximizing solution. When qualities produced become more similar, price competition 
intensifies. In response to quality standards, qualities rise, quality differentiation is reduced, 
and prices adjusted for quality fall. In the case of a single standard, only the low-quality 
provider is constrained. High quality rises also because qualities are strategic complements due 
to the effect of quality differentiation on price competition. Reduced quality differentiation 
results because increasing quality is increasingly costly. 
Even though the analysis of Leapfrogging 111 a vertical product differentiation 
framework has recently been addressed in the literature (see Section 4.2.), there is hardly any 
literature covering the usage of standards to induce Leapfrogging. The example presented here 
is from HergueralLutz (1996a). A more efficient domestic firm and a less efficient foreign firm 
operate in a single domestic market. The foreign firm initially produces and sells a product of 
higher quality. (This initial situation could be the outcome of the foreign firm being longer in 
the market than the domestic firm, so that the foreign firm operated as a Stackelberg-Ieader 
towards the domestic firm in the past.) Since the domestic firm could make higher profits by 
offering the higher quality, there is an incentive for the domestic government to facilitate this 
outcome by some policy. In the absence of a facilitating policy, however, the domestic firm 
cannot credibly leapfrog, since the current outcome represents a Nash-equilibrium. It is shown 
that the domestic government can choose a standard such that the domestic firm: (1) cannot 
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have nonnegative profits as the low-quality firm; and (2) can set a quality such that the foreign 
firm cannot have nonnegative profits as either the low-quality or the high-quality firm; and (3) 
domestic welfare is increased. Hence, the standard facilitates Leapfrogging as well as exit of 
the foreign competitor. This result depends cmcially on the cost asymmetry between domestic 
and foreign producers. Hence, the purpose of this analysis is to illustrate that domestic 
standards can have strategic trade effects that are not marginal but entail a complete 
restructuring of the international market in question. Here, a standard that is nonbinding for 
the foreign firm ultimately leads to the exit (or non-entry) of the foreign firm. This standard 
also enables the domestic firm to act exactly like a monopolist without the threat of entry. In 
doing this, the domestic firm chooses a quality that is not bound by the standard, higher than 
the quality it would have chosen without a standard, and higher than the quality the foreign 
firm would have chosen without the standard (potential "Leapfrogging"). 
However, it cannot be generally argued for the application of such policies, even though 
this case entails welfare increases for the domestic country. Since several examples can be 
constmcted where the outcomes are quite different, this suggests that policy makers should be 
aware of the possibility of rather radical and detrimental effects of domestic standards. 
4.3. Trade Liberalization 
MottalThisselCabrales (1995) investigate whether the openmg of trade will lead to 
persistence of an initial quality leadership caused by national differences in demand. Countries 
operate under autarchy in the first period, whereas trade occurs in the second. They conclude 
that persistence of leadership is most likely to result. This is the only possible outcome if 
differences in national demand are very large. In all other cases, i.e. when multiple equilibria 
exist, using the risk dominance criterion l5 leads to the selection of the persistence-of-Ieadership 
outcome. Initial leadership without trade, i.e. under autarky, is the result of one country 
having a bigger market than the other. This leads to quality choices where the firm in the 
bigger country offers a higher quality even though firms are identical. When trade is opened 
between both countries and firms can adjust their qualities accordingly (bearing adjustment 
15Looscly speaking, the risk dominance criterion means that firms evaluate the risk of ending up in the "wrong 
equilibrium" when choosing their strategies. 
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costs), the possibility arises for the firm offering the lower quality in autarky to now offer the 
higher quality in the joint market. This constitutes a case of Leapfrogging induced by trade 
liberalization. This is, however, only possible if country sizes are not to different. Furthermore, 
if both firms use the risk dominance criterion to select their strategies, Leapfrogging will 
generally not arise. 
This indicates that trade liberalization by itself is typically unlikely to lead to 
Leapfrogging. However, since the possibility of Leapfrogging is introduced by trade 
liberalization, this might influence the timing of other Leapfrogging-inducing policies. 
4.4. Tariffs 
Tariffs and quotas have been widely analyzed as protection instruments in international 
trade. The main argument for tariff protection in imperfectly competitive markets was put 
forward by Brander/Spencer (1984). In a duo poly, they argued, with one foreign and one 
domestic firm, the domestic government has incentives to impose a tariff on the foreign imports 
since it gains via three channels: it improves the terms of trade, it gains tariff revenues and it 
provides a strategic advantage to the domestic firm via an increase in its market share at the 
expense of the foreign competitor. When firms compete also in the long run in R&D 
investments that may lead to higher quality of the products on the market, tariffs may have 
important effects not only on the product market but also on the previous R&D optimal choice 
by each firm. 
If there is a monopoly Krishna (1987) showed that a specific tariff increases the price-
quality ratio of the high quality good less than the ratio of the low quality good. Since demand 
for each variety is inversely related to its price the total demand for the high quality good 
increases. The observed effect of the trade policy is an upgrading of the average quality. The 
ad valorem tariff has ambiguous effects on the quality offered in monopoly or leaves the 
qualities unaffected in perfect competition, as in Rodriguez (1979) or Santoni/Van Cott 
(1980). 
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In oligopoly the effect of a specific tariff on the imported high quality good depends on 
the credibility of the government announcement 16 and on the existence of set up costs of 
quality. Reitzes (1992) points out that if significant set up costs exist, then the tariff induces a 
suboptimal choice of quality on the part of the foreign firm. Furthermore, a high enough tariff 
protection may induce the domestic firm to achieve the first best quality choice. This is best 
explained as a coordination problem: when high fixed costs, no firm has incentives to commit 
to large investments unless a protection instrument guarantees that a sufficiently large market 
share will be enjoyed in the final products market. This can be achieved for the domestic firm 
if protected by a tariff. 
If the tariff announced is credible, there is an interval of tariffs (i.e., the non-prohibitive 
tariffs) that lead to quality downgrading on the part of the high quality foreign firm and to 
upgrading for the low-quality domestic firm. The tariff will reduce the market share of the 
foreign firm and increase the market share of the domestic firm.17 This leads to quality 
downgrading (upgrading) by the foreign (domestic) firm, since fixed costs of quality are 
distributed across less (more) output. More importantly, if firms do not believe the 
government announced tariff, the foreign firm will expect a high enough tariff that will provoke 
Leapfrogging and this induces the foreign firm to produce a lower quality than the rival 18 . 
Since the government gains by placing the domestic firm in the upper segment of the quality 
ladder, the home firm will produce the high quality good. It is interesting to note that in a 
partial one country equilibrium setting, the domestic government is better off by not 
committing to a specific tariff, since it can provoke Leapfrogging with a low ex-post tariff rate. 
4.5. Quantitative Trade Restrictions 
In perfect competition, first Falvey (1979) and Swan (1970) showed that a quantitative 
restriction on trade would lead to quality upgrading on the part of a multi-product 
monopolists. The quota places a shadow price on any unit of the high- or the low quality 
goods. Any increase in the quality of any of the goods reduces the shadow price of the 
16To the problem of credibility, compare also Lcahy/Neary (1994). 
t~This is essentially the same eITcct as in Brander/Spencer (1984). 
See HcrgucraIKuja IlPctrakis (1996). 
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restriction. Hence, raising quality as a response to the quantitative restriction is profitable for 
the monopolist assuming that the marginal consumer values quality increments less than the 
average consumer does. For the case of a monopolist serving a destination market, in a model 
of endogenous quality choice the effects of quotas in the product line of a monopolists have 
been studied l9 . In this vertical product differentiation model, quality is a factor that raises the 
willingness to pay for any given output. Depending on the rationing rule implied by the quota 
the marginal consumers left out after the quota may be the high valuation or the low valuation 
consumers. If only the low valuation marginal consumer is expelled of the market after the 
quantitative restriction then the monopolist raises the average quality of the products as a 
response. In what folIows, we discuss to what extent the result of quality-upgrading holds 
when there is strategic interaction among several firms. 
For the case of oligopoly the theoretical and empirical results are more complex. A very 
important distinction comes regarding the timing and credibility of the trade policy 
announcement. When the announcement of the quantitative restriction is credible and firms 
simultaneously choose the quality and the quantity of the good, the quotas may lead to quality 
upgrading depending on the initial location of the firms in the quality ladder. If the foreign 
(restricted) firm is the high quality producer, after the quota is imposed it will increase the 
quality attached to its good since total sales in the market decrease and marginal revenue is 
increasing in the quality. The high valuation consumers are willing to pay an increasing price if 
the quality offered is higher. The foreign firm quality response wiII be opposite if it starts 
producing the low quality good, whereas the domestic firm responds to a quota by increasing 
its quality if it produces the low quality initially or by downgrading if it produces the high 
quality initially2°. The driving force of these results lies in what Krishna points out as the quota 
as a "facilitating device" tending to reduce the amount of competition. In fact the facilitating 
practice result is very important since, depending on the timing of moves by the firms, it may 
lead to the opposite result, i.e., quality downgrading, by both firms in the market. We can 
think of the quality, or R&D investment, as a choice made for the long run, while the quantity 
~~see Krishna (1987), Spcnce (1976). 
See DaslDonnenfc1d (1987) , Krishna (1983) , Harris (1986) and Rics (1993). 
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(or price) competition takes place in the short run21 . In this setting the quality choice is a sunk 
investment for the firms in the short run. The quantitative restriction may lead to quality 
downgrading by both firms. The reason is, that the domestic firm may choose not to compete 
aggressively in the quality stage since it knows the foreign firm is restricted. This facilitating 
practice that occurs in the last stage may also feed back into the R&D or quality stage. If firms 
believe in the government policy announcement they will not invest as much in the quality of 
the goods to be delivered as they would under free trade since both know that market sales will 
be restricted in the last period. 
The quota may lead also to Leapfrogging. A quota set close to the free trade level of 
exchange will not induce any Leapfrogging, although it leads to small changes in the quality 
choices. There are, however, positive quota levels such that the initially high-quality foreign 
producer finds it no longer profitable to maintain its previous level of quality since the market 
share it will enjoy in the products market is expected to be too small. If the quota level 
announcement by the government is not credible the foreign firm expects precisely that level of 
quota to be implemented ex-post by the government and advancing it, it may decide to 
downgrade the quality of its products even below the quality offered by the domestic rival. It is 
important to note that in this idealized framework with only two competing firms, the domestic 
government achieves a Pareto improvement if it provokes the Leapfrogging. Profits for the 
firms are increasing in the quality segment and consumer surplus, even if total sales are reduced 
by the quota, increases due to the higher surplus derived from the high quality consumers22. 
Trade policy can cause a discontinuous change in the behavior of the firms in the quality as 
well as in the quantity (or price) dimension. It is also possible to combine a policy mix ofR&D 
subsidies together with specific tariffs or quotas in order to achieve the Leapfrogging23 . At 
this point it is very important to note that because of the presence of sunk or set-up costs of 
quality in the first stage, we can conclude that credibility is not an important asset for the 
domestic government. Clearly, if no sunk costs of quality exist, then no matter at what stage 
the government announces the policy, the quality choices will be optimal (first best). If the 
~~AS in HcrgueraIKujallPetrakis (1994). 
23As is shown in HcrgueralKujallPetrakis (1996). 
As in HcrgucraIKujallPctrakis (1996). 
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government announces the tariff or quota level after the qualities have been chosen, then it can 
extract all the rents from the foreign firm because the foreign firm does not have the possibility 
to react. As noted by Reitzes (1992) and HergueralKujallPetrakis (1996), it is the presence of 
sunk costs of quality in the sequential game that makes commitment on the part of the 
Government important for the competitors. 
Credibility of the government is not desirable in this one-country equilibrium 
framework since the government gains by provoking Leapfrogging and it achieves this with a 
Iow ex-post tariff or quota level. In this setting, firms can also strategically manipulate their 
quality choices in order to influence the resulting level of protection. The domestic firm may 
locate in the Iow-quality segment in order to achieve a higher protection level from the 
domestic government because it wants to induce Leapfrogging24 
In a more general setting with several countries, of course, all countries would face the 
same incentives to use quantitative restrictions to induce Leapfrogging, leading once again to 
the danger of an inefficient outcome. 
5. DifTerences in Cost Specifications and Market Structure 
The cost structure in combination with assumptions about the distribution of consumers 
determines the structure of firms' profits in equilibrium. The Type-A model leads to identical 
rankings of qualities and firms' profits, respectively. Changes of product qualities induced by 
trade policy that lead to lower product differentiation will generally reduce profits of both firms 
but increase their market shares. This is possible since market coverage is increased by this 
policy (absolutely more consumers purchase products) (Ronnen 1991, Lutz 1993). The 
ranking of firms' profits, however, remains unchanged. However, if the market is covered 
already in unregulated equilibria (see Shaked/Sutton 1982 for the appropriate condition), the 
same policy will lead to an increase of the market share of the low-quality firm and a decrease 
of the market share of the high-quality firm (Boom 1995, CrampeslHollander 1995). 
Furthermore, in the Type-A model. the high-quality firm can increase its market share by 
24 Another reason for quantitatiyc restrictions is when therc are informational externalities in the consumption 
of the goods. In this case the informational cxternality may lead to suboptimallevcls of quality chosen by all the 
competitors. The Government may upgradc thc averagc quality in thc market and to achieve this it may set 
quantitative restrictions at thc individuallevcl. See DonnenfcldIMayer (1987). 
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lowering price without increasing total cost. This possibility is greatly reduced in the presence 
of variable costs. As a result, the case of market coverage and variable costs quadratic in 
quality leads to identical profits and market shares for both firms (CrampeslHollander 1995). 
This means that the choice of higher quality does not any more entail a strategic advantage for 
the respective firm. Moreover, trade policy will now lead to overproportional losses of the 
high-quality firm. In summary, it can be concluded that the effects of trade policy are highly 
dependent on assumptions about costs and demand structure. More comparative analysis in 
this area will be necessary to adequadely assess the robustness of any policy analysis presented. 
6. Empirical Evidence 
Empirical evidence on Leapfrogging or even on vertical quality differentiation is mostly 
anectodal or based on case studies. In many cases, it also takes the form of analyses of general 
conditions in developing countries. Some of these studies cover the computer industry in 
Eastern Europe (Bodea 1994), telecommunications in developing countries (Antonelli 1991), 
the Brazilian information technology industry (Bornstein 1995), the East-Asian semiconductor 
industry (Hong 1993), or technical cooperation with developing countries (Brinkerhoff (1990). 
Direct empirical applications of models of vertical product differentiation are currently 
virtually non-existent (exceptions are, e.g., Messinger 1989 or Thomas 1988). This is probably 
due to two main reasons. The first is the (afore mentioned) lack of robustness of theoretical 
results. The second is the general problem of quality measurement. Studies about 
measurement of quality have been forwarded by Feenstra (1988, 1993), Greenaway (1984), 
Levinsohn (1988), Menzler-Hokkanen (1994). Provided that appropriate quality indices were 
available, empirical industry models of vertical quality differentiation using any particular 
quality measure might be constructed similarly to the way models of horizontal (or unspecified) 
quality differentiation have been constructed (compare, e.g., Dixit 1988, 
GasioreklSmith/Venables 1992, Smith/Venables 1988). However, this has not been done yet 
(to our knowledge). 
In summary, the available empirical evidence suggests that Leapfrogging is an especially 
relevant phenomenon for developing and transformation economies. 
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7. Conclusions 
The purpose of this paper was to present an overview of existing literature on 
Leapfrogging. The research discussed suggest that several domestic policies might have 
strategic trade effects that are not marginal but entail a complete restructuring of the 
international market in question. These policies do not only include traditional trade policies 
such as tariffs and quantitative trade restrictions but also others such as R&D subsidies and 
quality standards. Furthermore, in addition to Leapfrogging, they might also induce exit or 
entry deterence. 
However, we cannot generally conclude from the research discussed that these policies 
should be applied, even though most cases presented entail welfare increases for the domestic 
country. Since the results are mostly not robust with respect to country asymmetries and 
market conduct, this rather suggests that policy makers should be aware of the possibility of 
rather radical and detrimental effects of domestic policies. It also suggests that current 
theoretical research is still a long \vay from a general analysis of Leapfrogging-inducing 
policies. Hence, it is not too surprising that the state of empirical research is even more 
wanting. 
Bibliography 
Antonelli, C. (1991). The DilTusion of Advanced Telecommunications in De\'eloping Countries (OECD, 
Paris). 
Aoki, R. (1995). "Sequential \'s. Simultaneous Quality Choices with Bertrand and Cournot Competitions," 
mimeo., SUNY Stony Brook. 
BaIdwin, R. and A. 1. Venablcs (l99-l). "Regional Economic Integration." Conference Paper, European 
Research Workshop in International Trade (CEPR. Rome, September 199-l). 
Bodea, S. A. (1994). "Key Success Factors in Efficient and Errective Transfer of Hardware, Software, and 
Management Know-How to the Former Socialist Countries of Central and Eastern Europe," Ph.D. 
Dissertation, Harvard University. 
Bond, E. W. (1988). "Optimal Commercial Polic), with Quality-Differentiated Products," Journal of 
International Economics, Vol. 25, pp. 271-290. 
Boom, A. (1995). "Asymmetric International Minimum Quality Standards and Vertical Dirrerentiation," 
Journal ofIndustrial Economics. Vol. 43(1). pp. 101-119. 
Bomstein, L. M. (1995). "Flexible Production in the Unstable State: The Brazilian Information Technology 
Industry," Ph.D. Dissertation. UCLA. 
18 
Brander, 1. A. and P. R. Knlgman (1983). "A Reciprocal Dumping Model of International Trade." Journal of 
International Economics. Vol. 15, pp. 313-323. 
Brander, 1. A. and B. J. Spencer (1984). "Tariff Protection and Imperfect Competition," in: H. Kierzkowski 
(ed.) Monopolistic Competition and International Trade (Clarendon Press. Oxford). 
Bresnahan, T. F. (1989). "Empirical Studies of Industries with Market Power." in: Schmalensee. R. and R. 
Willig (eds.) Handbook ofIndustrial Economics. Vol. 2 (North Holland. Amsterdam). 
Brinkerhoff. D.-W. (1990). "Technical Cooperation and Training in Development Management in the 1990s: 
Trends, Implications and Recommendations." Canadian Journal of Development Studies. Vol. I1 (I), pp. 
139-1-l9. 
Cabrales, A. and M. Molta (1996). "Country Asymmetries. Endogenous Product Choice and the Speed of 
Trade Liberalization." CEPR Discussion Paper No. 1326. 
Champsaur. P. and 1.-c. Rochet (1989). "Multi product Duopolists." Econometrica. Vol. 57(3). pp. 533-557. 
Crampes, C. and A. Hollander (1995). "Duopoly and Quality Standards." European Economic Review. Vol. 
39, pp. 71-82. 
Cremer, H. and J.-F. Thisse (1994). "Commodity Taxation in a Differentiated Oligopoly," International 
Economic Review, Vol. 35(3). pp. 613-633. 
Das, S. P. and S. Donnenfeld (1989). "Oligopolistic Competition and International Trade: Quantity and 
Quality Restrictions." Journal ofInternational Economics. Vol. 27(3-·n. pp. 299-318. 
__ (1987). "Trade Policy and its Impact on Quality ofImports: A Welfare Analysis." Journal of 
International Economics. Vol. 23, pp. 77-95. 
Dixit, A. (1988). "Optimal Trade and Industrial Policies for the US Automobile Industry." in: R. C. Feenstra 
(cd.) Empirical Methods for International Trade (MIT Press. Cambridge. MA). 
Donnenfeld. S. and W. Mayer (1987). "The Quality of Export Products and Optimal Trade Policy." 
International Economic Review. Vol. 28. 
Donnenfeld. S. and S. Weber (1992). "Vertical Product Differentiation With Entry." International Journal of 
Industrial Organization. Vol. 10. pp. -l-l9-472. 
Falvey, R. E. (1979). "The Composition of Trade Within Import-Restricted Categories." Journal of Political 
Economy. Vol. 87, pp. 1105-1114. 
Feenstra, R. C. (1993). "Measuring the Welfare ElTect of Quality Change: Theory and Application to Japanese 
Autos," 1'.'BER Discussion Paper No. 4401. 
__ (1988). "Quality Change under Trade Restraints in Japanese Autos." Quarterl\' Journal of Economics, 
Vol. ?,pp.131-1-l6. 
Gabszewicz, J. J. and J.-F. Thisse (1979). "Price Competition, Quality and Income Disparities." Journal of 
Economic Theorv, Vol. 20, pp. 340-359. 
Gasiorek, M., A. Smith and A. 1. Venables (1992). "Constrained Optimal Trade Policy for Imperfectly 
Competitive Industries." in: Kriiger H. and K. F. Zimmermann (eds.) Export Activity and Strategic Trade 
Polic\' (Springer, Heidelberg). 
Greenaway, D. (198-l). "The Measurement ofProducl Differentiation in Empirical Studies of Trade Flo,,:s," in: 
H. Kierzkowski (ed.) Monopolistic Competition and International Trade (Clarendon Press, Oxford). 
Grimwade, N. (1989). International Trade. New Patterns of Trade. Production and Investment (Routledge, 
London). 
Harris, R. (1985). "Why Voluntary Export Restraints arc Voluntary?" Canadian Journal of Economics Vol. 18. 
19 
Herguera, I., Kujal, P. and E. Petrakis (1996). "Endogencous quality. non-crcdible policies and Leapfrogging," 
mimeo., Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. 
__ (1994). "Quantity Rcstrictions and Endogenous Quality Choicc." Uni\"Cfsidad Carlos m de Madrid. 
Working Paper 94-36. 
Herguera, I. and S. Lutz (1996a). "Minimum Quality Standards as Facilitating Dcviccs: An Example With 
Leapfrogging and Exit," mimco., Univcrsidad Carlos III dc Madrid. 
__ (1996b). "R&D Subsidics and Intcrnational Lcapfrogging." mimco .. Univcrsidad Carlos III de Madrid. 
Hong. S. G. (1993). "Thc Politics of Industrial Lcapfrogging: Thc Scmiconductor Indust!)' in Tawan and South 
Korca," Ph.D. Dissertation, Northwcstcrn Univcrsity. 
Hung, N. M. and N. Schmitt (1992). "Quality Compctition and Thrcat of Ent!)' in Duopoly," in Gee, 1. M. A. 
and G. Norman (eds.), Market Stratcgy and Stnlcturc (Harvester Whcatshcaf, Ncw York), pp. 289-308. 
Krishna, K. (1989). "Trade Restrictions as Facilitating Practiccs," Journal ofTntcrnational Economics, Vol. 26, 
pp. 251-270. 
__ (1987). "Tariffs vs. Quotas \rith Endogcnous Quality." Journal orrntcrnational Economics. Vol. 23, pp. 
97-122. 
Leahy, D., and P. Near), (1995a). "Public policy towards R&D in oligopolistic industrics." Ccntcr for 
Economic Rescarch Workin Papcr. No. 95-11. Uni\"Cfsity Collcgc Dublin. 
__ (1995b). "Intcrnational R&D ri\'alry and industrial stratcgy \\ithout gO\'crllmcnt commitmcnt." CEPR 
Discussion Papcr No. 1199. 
__ (1994). "Time consistcncy, Icarning by doing and infant industry protcction: the lincar casc," The 
Economic and Social Rcvicw. Vol. 26(1). pp. 59-68. 
Leland. H. E. (1979). ·'Quacks. Lcmons. and Licensing: A Thcory of Minimum Quality Standards." Journal of 
Political Economv, Vol. 87. pp. 1328-1346. 
Levinsohn. J. (1988). "Empirics of Taxcs on Differcntiatcd Products: Thc Casc of Tariffs in thc U.S. 
Automobilc Indust!)'," in: R. Baldwin (cd.) Trade PoliC\' Isslles and Empirical AnalYsis (NBER. Chicago). 
Lutz, S. (1996a). "Does Mutual Recognition of l\'ational Minilllulll Quality Standards Support Rcgional 
Convcrgcncc?" CEPR Discussion P~lper No. 1385. 
__ (199Gb). "Tradc Effects of Minimum Quality Standards \\ith and \\ ithout Detcrred Entry." CEPR 
Discussion Papcr No. 1384. 
__ (l996c). "Vcrtical Product Differenli~ltion. Quality Standards. And International Tradc Policy." CEPR 
Discussion Papcr No. 1443. 
Maycr. W. (1982). "Thc Tariff EquiYalcnt of I mporl Standards." Intcrnational Economic Re\"iew. Vol. 23, pp. 
723-734. 
Mcnzlcr-Hokkancn, 1. (1994). "Empirical Comparisons of Quality Mcasurcs in Intcrnational Tradc," in: 
Quality Change and Compctitivencss in IntcrnCltional Tradc (Hclsinki School of Business Administration, 
Helsinki). 
Messinger. P. R. (1989). "StnIctural Implications and Estimation of Vertical Product Differcntiation." Ph.D. 
Disscrtation, Uni\'crsity of California. Bcrkclcy. 
Mintz, I. (1973). "U.S. Import Quotas: Cost and Conscquences." Amcrican Enterprise Institute for Public 
Policy Rcscarch 
Molta. M .. Thisse, J.-F. and A. Cabralcs (1995). "On thc Pcrsistcncc of Lcadcrship or Lcapfrogging in 
Intcrnational Tradc," CEPR Discussion Papcr J 1 (l6. 
Motta, M. (1993). "Endogcnous Quality Choicc: Pricc vs. Quantity Compctition." Journal of Industrial 
Economics. Vol. 41, pp. 113-132. 
__ (1992). "Sunk Costs and Trade Libcralisation." Economic Journal. Vol. 102, pp. 578-587. 
__ (1991). "Cooperati\'c R&D and Vertical Product Diffcrcntiation." Intcrnational Journal orrndustrial 
Organization. Vol. 10, pp. 643-661. 
Mussa. M. and S. Roscn (1978). "Monopoly and Product QUCllity." Journal of Economic Thcory. Vol. 18, pp. 
301-317. 
Reitzes, 1. D. (1992). "QllCllity Choicc. Tradc Policy. and Firm Inccnti\·cs." Intcrnational Economic Rcvicw. 
Vol. 33(4). 
Ries, J. C. (1993). "VoluntClry E:'\pon Rcstraints. Profits. and Quality Acljustl11cnt." Canadian Journal of 
Economics. No. 3. 
Rodrigucz, C. A. (1979). "Thc Quality ofTmpons and thc Diffcrcntial Welfarc Effccts of Tariffs. Quotas and 
Quality Controls on Protcctive De\·ices. Canadian Journal of Economics. Vol. 12, pp. 439-449. 
Ronnen, U. (1991). "Minimum Quality Standards. Fixed Costs. and Compctition." Rand Journal of Economics, 
Vol. 22(4), pp. 490-504. 
Santoni, G. 1. and T. N. Van Colt (1980). "Import Quotas: The Quality Adjustment Problcm," Southern 
Economic Journal, Vol. 46, pp. 1206-1211. 
Shaked, A. and J. Sutton (1982). "Relaxing Price Competition Through Product Differentiation," Review of 
Economic Studies, Vol. 49, pp. 3-l3. 
Shapiro, C. (1983). "Premiums for High Quality Products as Returns to Reputations," Quarterh' Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 98, pp. 659-679. 
Smith, A. and A. J. Venables (1988). "Completing the Internal Market in the European Community," 
European Economic Review. Vol. 32, pp. 1501-1525. 
Spence, M. (1975), "Monopoly, Quality and Regulation," BeJl Journal of Economics, Vol. 6, pp. 417-429. 
Swan, P. (1970). "Durability of Consumption Goods," American Economic Review. Vol. 60(5), pp. 884-894. 
Thomas, J. M. (1988). "Interfirm Rivalry - Price Versus Quality: The Household Goods Motor Carrier 
Industry," Ph.D. Dissertation. Boston CoJlege. 
Tirole, J. (1988). The Theorv ofIndustrial Organization (MIT Press. Cambridge, MA). 
Waterson. M. (1989). "Models of Product Differentiation." Bul1etin of Economic Research, Vol. 41: 1. 
20 
21 
Appendix 
A.I. The Model - Price (Bertrand) Competition 
There are two firms, the domestic firm d and the forcign firm f. both competing in the domestic 
market. If both firms rcmain in thc market, then they produce distinct goods, sold at prices Pd and Pf, 
respectively. The two products carl)' a single quality attribute dcnotcd by sd and sf. rcspectively. Either firm 
faces production costs that are increasing, convex (quadratic) functions of quality, the exact level of which 
depending on quality choscn and a quality cost paramcter b. Total costs offirm i are then: 
ci = bi Si2 (1) 
In the domestic market, there is a continuum of consumcrs distributcd uniformly over the interval [0, 
T] with unit density. Each consumer purchases at most one unit of cithcr firm d's product or firm rs product. 
The higher a consumcr's income paramcter t. thc highcr is hcr (his) rcscn'ation price. Consumer t's utility is 
given by equation (2) if good i is purchased.2) Consumers who do not purchasc rccei\'e zcro utility. 
Ut=sit-Pi (2) 
Firms d and fplay a two-stage game26. In the first stage. firms dctcrmil1f qualities to bc produccd and 
incur costs ci (i = d, f). In thc second stagc, firms choosc priccs simultancously.2 
Price Compctition 
To solve the gamc. consider first the dcmand faccd by thc high-quality and low-qualit~frm, 
respcctively. Let hand 0 stand for high and low quality. rcspcctivcly. Thcsc dcmands arc thcn gi\'cn by: 
gh =T-C Ph -Po), go = Ph -Po _& (3) 
Sh-so Sh-so S,) 
Lct i = h, 0: Ict j 1::- i. Thc profit function for firm i is gi\'cn by n i = Pjqj(Pj.Pj.Si.Sj) - Cj(si)' Takcn 
both qualitics as givcn. the pricc rcaction functions in cach markct arc givcn as thc solutions to thc first ordcr 
conditions. Solving thc rcsulting cquations for both prices. cquilibrium prices are thcn givcn as: 
(4) 
Note that for all sh > so' T > th > to > 0 will hold. i.e .. cquation (4) is in fact an unconstraincd price 
equilibrium. 
Givcn thc pricc cquil ibrium dcpictcd abO\·c. dcmands and thus profits can bc cxprcssed in tcrms of 
qualities. For positi\'c qualitics Si (i = h. 0). thcsc profit functions arc: 
n =4T~Sh~(Sh-SO)_bs~ n =T~Sh(Sh-Sa>So_bs2 
h (4s
h 
-so)~ h h· 0 (4s
h 
-sa>~ 0 0 (5) 
Similarly, consumer surplus29 can bc expresscd in thc following way: 
(6) 
~~ Consumers who do not purchase rccci\'e zcro utility. 
In this formulation, firm i not entering the markct is cquinllcnt to firm i choosing Si = O. Thc cntry dccision 
~1 firms is made simultancously when choosing quality. 
To dcrh'e solutions. wc will use the concept ofsubgamc-perfcct cquilibrium. computing thc solutions for each 
stage in re\'crse ordcr. Both firms choose thcir rcspcctive product quality from thc same intcrval/O. 0',). The 
rcsulting market equilibria will includc somc consumcrs in thc lowcr scgmcnt of thc inten'al [0. TJ not valuing 
~~ality cnough to buy any product. This guarantecs an intc.rior solution o~thc ~ric~ game. . 
Let tll = (Ph - Po)/(sh - so) and to = Po/so. Consumcrs WIth t = polso \\'Ill be mdIfTcrcnt bctwcen bu)'mg thc 
low-quality product and not buying at all. Consumers with t = (Ph - Po)/(sh - So) will bc indiffercnt betwcen 
buying either the high-quality or the low-quality product. Consumers with T ~ t > th will buy high quality, 
consumers with th > t > to will buy low quality. and consumcrs with t < polso will not buy at all. 
29Consumer surplus is dcfined as {f(t*Sh - Ph)dt + Jct*so - Po)dt} wherc thc first intcgral goes from th to T and 
the second goes from to to th' 
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Properties of the Revenue and Consumer Surplus Functions 
Let Ri denote firm i's revenue function. Let hand 0 denote high and low quality, respectively. 
oRh ~ 0; oRo ~ 0 for So ::; 4sh ; oRh < 0, oRo > 0; 
OSh 05
0 
7 oSo OSh 
02Rh ~ 02Rh 
::; 0; o-Ro o· > 0: 
OSh2 OS02 ::;, OShOSo 
> O. 
Let CSI (I = D, F) denote region I's consumer surplus function. Finns' qualities are denoted by sh and 
So for high and low quality, respectively. 
Qualitv Competition 
To derive the firms' quality best responses. we investigate each finn's profit function, given the other 
firm's quality choice, and taking into account the behavior in the price-setting subgame. Given the order of 
qualities, the profit functions in equations (5) are concm'e in the respective firm's own quality. The profit-
maximizing choices form a Nash-equilibrium in qualities, where both marginal profit functions evaluate to 
zero. The first order conditions for the high and low quality firm, respectively, arc then given as: 
T~Sh ~ (4sh - 7sJ / (4sh - SJ3 = 2b o so 
(7) 
The slopes of the high and low quality finns' quality best responses can be calculated (using the implicit 
function theorem) as dsjldsj = -(c(cnjlcsi)lcsj)/(c(cnjlcSi)lcSi)' where i is either high or low quality and j is 
the other quality. Both slopes arc positive, but less than onc. 
From the properties of the revenue functions and the slopes of the quality best responses, it can be 
derh'ed that the two qualities are strategic complements. Furthermore. a forced increase of the low quality will 
reduce product differentiation and increase price competition. 
Di\'ide the first order conditions given in (7), rearrange and write sh = r So and bo = a bh to obtain: 
4(2-3r+4r2) r 
4r2 -7r a 
For a=1 ( i.e. bo = bh = b) r = 5.25123 while for a=2 ( i.e. bo = 2 bh = 2 b) r = 9.14152. Using r to express sh 
in terms of So and substituting for sh in the first equation of (7) allows for calculating the equilibrium qualities 
for any gi\'en value of T and b. (However. the ratio of cost parameters a must be fixed.) 
The resulting equilibrium qualities for i~entical firms (i.e. bh = bo 2' b) are then: 30 
Sh=O.126655T Ibandso =O.0241192T Ib 
A.2. Quantity (Coumot) Competition 
When firms uSe quantity as the strategic variable in the second stage of the industry game, the 
behavior of the model changeS in some aspects. Most importantly, price competition will be reduced and the 
low-quality firm sets its quality as a strategic substitute to the high quality (rather than a complement). 
Quantitv Competition 
To solve the game, consider first the inverse demand faced by the high-quality and low-quality firm, 
respectively. Let hand 0 stand for high and low quality. respectively. These demands are then given by: 
Ph = T sh - sh % -so qo' Po = (T - % -qo) So (3') 
Let i = h, 0: let j ~ i. The profit function for firm i is given by Di = Piqi(Pi,Pj,Si,Sj) - ci(si)' Taken 
both qualities as given, the quantity reaction functions in each market are given as the solutions to the first 
order conditions. Solving the resulting equations for both quantities, equilibrium quantities are then given as: 
(4') 
30Note that T2/b enters in a multiplicative way and therefore does not affect the calculations. 
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Given the quantity equilibrium dcpictcd above. demands and thus profits can be expresscd in terms of 
qualities. For positive qualities si (i = h, 0), these profit functions are: 
(5') 
Properties of the RevcnucFunctions 
Let Ri denotc firm i's revenue function. Let hand 0 denotc high and lo\\' quality, rcspcctively. 
oRh ~ 0', oRo o ~ 0 for So ::; 
Sh OSo 
4sh . oRh oRo 
-, < 0, -- < 0; 
7 oSo OSh 
::; 0; > 0: < O. 
Quality Competition 
Thc first order conditions for thc high and la\\' quality firm. respccti\·cly. arc gi\'cn as: 
T2(4sh +SJ/(4Sh -SJ3 = 2b oso 
(7) 
The slopcs of the high and low quality firms' quality best responscs can be calculated using the implicit function 
thcorem. Both slopcs are less than one in absolute \·alue. The high- (10\\'-) quality bcst rcsponse has a positive 
(negativc) slopc. 
Thc rcsulting cquilibrium qualities for iqcntical firms (i.c. bl! = bo ? b) are then: 
sh = 0.125971 T / b and So = O.O.t51116 r / b 
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